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JURISDICTION 
Defendant has no objection to the Plaintiff's statement of jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Defendant disagrees with the Plaintiff's Statement of the Issues 
Presented for Review #1 . Plaintiff's issue #1 was not a basis of the Court's 
decisions on the Order on Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute 
Decedent's Heirs as a Party (R. at 129-32) and the Order on URCP Rule 25 
Motion to Dismiss (R. at 150-52). The following is a more appropriate 
statement of the issue presented for review: 
I. Whether the District Court exceeded its permitted range of 
discretion by striking the Plaintiff's Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("URCP") 
Rule 25 motion to substitute because the motion sought to substitute the 
wrong party and did not contain the required notice of hearing. 
Standard of Review: Whether the Court exceeded its permitted range 
of discretion in granting a motion to strike is reviewed on an abuse of 
discretion standard. Rivera ex rel. Rivera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 
2000 UT 36, 117, 1 P.3d 539. 
The Defendant does not object to the Plaintiff's Statement of Issue 
Presented for Review #2 and the Standard of Review. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The Defendant agrees the interpretation of URCP Rule 25, Utah Code 
Ann. §75-3-104 (1975) and Utah Code Ann. §78-ll-12(l)(a)(1991) are 
determinative of this appeal. In addition, the Defendant asserts that URCP 
41 and its interpretation is determinative of this appeal. However, the 
Defendant disagrees that Utah Code Ann. §75-2-103 (1998) and Utah Code 
Ann. §75-2-106 (1998) are determinative of any issue in this case. 
• URCP Rule 25. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES 
(a) Death. 
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, 
the court may order substitution of the proper parties. The 
motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the 
successors or representatives of the deceased party and, 
together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the 
parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the 
manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons. Unless 
the motion for substitution is made not later than ninety days 
after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a 
statement of the fact of the death as provided herein for the 
service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the 
deceased party. 
(2) In the event of the death of one or more of the plaintiffs or 
of one or more of the defendants in an action in which the right 
sought to be enforced survives only to the surviving plaintiffs or 
only against the surviving defendants, the action does not abate. 
The death shall be suggested upon the record and the action 
shall proceed in favor of or against the surviving parties. 
(b) Incompetency. If a party becomes incompetent, the 
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court upon motion served as provided in Subdivision (a) of this 
rule may allow the action to be continued by or against his 
representative. 
(c) Transfer of Interest. In case of any transfer of interest, 
the action may be continued by or against the original party, 
unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the 
interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined 
with the original party. Service of the motion shall be made as 
provided in Subdivision (a) of this rule. 
(d) Public Officers; Death or Separation From Office. 
When a public officer is a party to an action and during its 
pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the 
action may be continued and maintained by or against his 
successor, if within 6 months after the successor takes office, it 
is satisfactorily shown to the court that there is a substantial 
need for so continuing and maintaining it. Substitution pursuant 
to this rule may be made when it is shown by supplemental 
pleading that the successor of an officer adopts or continues or 
threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. 
Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, 
unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable 
notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to 
object. 
URCP Rule 25. 
• URCP Rule 41 . DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS 
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof. 
(1) By Plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 
66(i), and of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed 
by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of 
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an 
answer or other response to the complaint permitted under 
these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, 
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of 
dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed 
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by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United 
States or of any state an action based on or including the same 
claim. 
(2) By Order of Court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of 
dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an 
action may only be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on 
order of the court based either on: 
(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the 
action; or 
(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. 
If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the 
service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action 
shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless 
the counterclaim can remain pending for independent 
adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the 
order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof. For failure of the 
plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order 
of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of 
any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by 
the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his 
evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer 
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a 
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the 
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the 
facts may then determine them and render judgment against the 
plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of 
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits 
against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in 
Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal 
not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable 
party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of Counterclaim, Cross-Claim, or Third-Party 
Claim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any 
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counterclaim, cross- claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary 
dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of 
Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of 
evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of Previously-Dismissed Action. If a plaintiff who 
has once dismissed an action in any court commences an action 
based upon or including the same claim against the same 
defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of 
costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper 
and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has 
complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or Undertaking to Be Delivered to Adverse Party. 
Should a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, 
after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, the 
bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy 
must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party 
against whom such provisional remedy was obtained. 
URCP Rule 41 
• 78-11-12 Survival of action for injury to person or death upon 
death of wrongdoer or injured person —Exception and 
restriction to out-of-pocket expenses. 
(1) (a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the person or 
death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another do not 
abate upon the death of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The 
injured person or the personal representatives or heirs of the person 
who died have a cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal 
representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general damages, 
subject to Subsection (l)(b). 
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person dies as a 
result of a cause other than the injury received as a result of the 
wrongful act or negligence of the wrongdoer, the personal 
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representatives or heirs of that person have a cause of action against 
the wrongdoer or personal representatives of the wrongdoer only for 
special damages occurring prior to death that result from the injury 
caused by the wrongdoer, including income loss. "Special damages" 
does not include pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and 
other not readily quantifiable damages frequently referred to as 
general damages. 
(2) Under Subsection (1) neither the injured person nor the personal 
representatives or heirs of the person who died may recover judgment 
except upon competent satisfactory evidence other than the testimony 
of that injured person. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-11-12 (2001). 
• 75-3-104 Claims against decedent —Necessity of 
administration. 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or 
his successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment 
of a personal representative. After the appointment and until 
distribution, all proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the 
estate are governed by the procedure prescribed by this Chapter 3. 
After distribution a creditor whose claim has not been barred may 
recover from the distributees as provided in Section 75-3-1004 or from 
a former personal representative individually liable as provided in 
Section 75-3-1005. This section has no application to a proceeding by 
a secured creditor of the decedent to enforce his right to his security 
except as to any deficiency judgment which might be sought therein. 
Editorial Board Comment.—This and sections of Part 8, Chapter 3, are 
designed to force creditors of decedents to assert their claims against 
duly appointed personal representatives. Creditors of a decedent are 
interested persons who may seek the appointment of a personal 
representative (§ 75-3-301). If no appointment is granted to another 
within 45 days after the decedent's death, a creditor may be eligible to 
be appointed if other persons with priority decline to serve or are 
ineligible (§ 75-3-203). But, if a personal representative has been 
appointed and has closed the estate under circumstances which leave 
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a creditor's claim unbarred, the creditor is permitted to enforce his 
claims against distributees, as well as against the personal 
representative if any duty owed to creditors under § 75-3-807 or 75-3-
1003 has been breached. The methods for closing estates are outlined 
in §§ 75-3-1001 through 75-3-1003. Termination of appointment 
under § 75-3-608 et seq. may occur though the estate is not closed 
and so may be irrelevant to the question of whether creditors may 
pursue distributees. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-104 (1975). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against the Defendant as a 
result of an automobile accident. Before the action could be tried, the 
Defendant passed away. The Defendant's death was suggested upon the 
record by the Defendant's counsel. In addition, Defendant's counsel sent a 
letter to the Plaintiff's counsel indicating that at that time no personal 
representative had been appointed for the Defendant's estate. The Plaintiff 
moved to substitute the Defendant's surviving siblings as the "proper party" 
to the action. The Plaintiff failed to provide the Defendant's surviving 
siblings with a notice of a hearing on motion to name them as parties to the 
action. Accordingly, Defendant's counsel moved to strike the motion to add 
the Defendant's brothers and sisters as the "proper party" to this action 
under URCP Rule 25. The District Court agreed with the Defendant and 
struck the motion to add the Defendant's siblings as the "property party." 
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The Plaintiff failed to make a motion that sought to substitute the 
Defendant's personal representative as a party to this action within ninety 
(90) days of the notice of suggestion of death. Defendant's counsel moved 
to dismiss the action for the Plaintiff's failure to comply with URCP Rule 25. 
The Plaintiff did not oppose the motion to dismiss and the Court granted the 
motion. After the Court granted the motion, the Plaintiff appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 10, 2001, a Notice of Suggestion of Death was 
filed by the Defendant's counsel. (R. at 35). 
2. On December 18, 2001, Defendant's counsel informed the 
Plaintiff's counsel that no personal representative had been appointed for the 
Defendant's estate. (R. at 113). 
3. On March 1, 2002, the Plaintiff filed a motion and supporting 
memorandum to substitute the "proper parties" for the deceased Defendant. 
(R. at 65-71). 
4. However, rather than seeking to name the personal 
representative of the Defendant, the Plaintiff's motion sought to have the 
Defendant's surviving siblings (two brothers and three sisters) substituted as 
the "proper parties" in this case. (R. at 69-70). 
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5. The Affidavit of Thomas N. Thompson filed in support of the 
motion to substitute states, "It is necessary to substitute the names of the 
decedent's heirs for the decedent in this case." (R. at 74). 
6. The Plaintiff then served upon four of the five of the Defendant's 
surviving siblings a "Notice of Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Proper Parties 
for Deceased Defendant." (As to Sara Flink, R. at 75-76; As to N. De Von 
Curtis, R. at 78-79; As to Barbara Inkley, R. at 85-86; As to J. Kent Curtis, 
R. at 118-19). 
7. Each notice contained the same statement, "You have been 
identified as a sibling of the decedent, Dale H. Curtis, who is a proper party 
defendant to the above action." (As to Sara Flink, R. at 76; As to N. De Von 
Curtis, R. at 79; As to Barbara Inkley, R. at 86; As to J. Kent Curtis, R. at 
119). 
8. In addition, rather than provide the Defendant's surviving 
siblings with a notice of a hearing set on the motion so that they could 
appear and defend, each notice contained the statement "Should you have 
any objection to this motion, you should file the same with the Clerk, Third 
Judicial District Court, . . . at any time within fourteen days after service of 
the attached documents upon you. In the absence of a timely objection, the 
Court may grant the Plaintiff's motion without further notice." (As to Sara 
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Flink, R. at 76; As to N. De Von Curtis, R. at 79; As to Barbara Inkley, R. at 
86; As to J. Kent Curtis, R. at 119). 
9. However, the Plaintiff did not serve Rula Flink, the Defendant's 
sister, with the notice, motion to substitute or supporting memorandum. 
(Entire Record). 
10. Neither Sara Flink, N. De Von Curtis, Barbara Inkley, nor J. Kent 
Curtis is the Defendant's personal representative. (Entire Record). 
11. On March 5, 2002, Defendant filed a Motion to Strike the 
Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Parties with supporting memorandum upon 
the grounds that the motion to substitute sought to substitute the wrong 
parties and did not contain the required notice of hearing. (R. at 92-99). 
12. Although aware of the deficiencies of his motion to substitute 
prior to the expiration of the ninety (90) day period, the Plaintiff refused to 
move to substitute the personal representative of the Defendant and 
continued forward with his claim that the Defendant's surviving siblings were 
the proper parties to this action. (Entire Record). 
13. The District Court found (a) that the Defendant's death was 
suggested on the record on December 7, 2001; (b) the Plaintiff was 
attempting to substitute the Defendant's heirs as the proper party in this 
action; (c) the Defendant's heirs are not the Defendant's personal 
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representatives; and (d) the Plaintiff's motion to substitute does not contain a 
notice of hearing. (R. at 130) 
14. The Court concluded that the Plaintiff's motion to substitute does 
not seek to substitute the Decedent's personal representative for the deceased 
party and is improper and must be stricken. (R. at 131) 
15. The Court also concluded that the Plaintiff's motion to substitute 
did not contain the required notice of hearing and that defect was also fatal to 
the motion. (R. at 131). 
16. The Court entered an Order granting the Motion to Strike 
Plaintiff's motion to substitute Decedent's Heirs as a Party on April 29, 2002. 
(R. at 129-32) 
17. On April 18, 2002, the Defendant moved with supporting 
memorandum to dismiss the action pursuant to URCP Rule 25 for the 
Plaintiff's failure to move to substitute the proper party for the deceased 
Defendant. (R. at 124-28). 
18. The Plaintiff did not oppose the motion to dismiss. (R. at 136-37 
and 138). 
19. On June 12, 2002, the Court entered an order granting the 
Defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice. (R. at 150-52). 
l i 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court did not exceed its permitted range of discretion by striking 
the Plaintiff's motion to substitute that sought to substitute the wrong 
parties and failed to contain the required notice of hearing. Upon the death 
of the Defendant, the Plaintiff's cause of action could be revived against the 
personal representative of the Defendant. The Plaintiff merely had to file a 
motion seeking to substitute the Defendant's personal representative or 
"John/Jane Doe, the undetermined personal representative of the 
Defendant." The Plaintiff refused to do so and sought to have the 
Defendant's surviving siblings named as a party to this action. In addition, 
the Plaintiff's motion to substitute failed to contain the required notice of 
hearing. Accordingly, the District Court, within its permitted range of 
discretion, struck the motion to substitute. In the alternative, the District 
Court's interpretation that URCP Rule 25 required the Plaintiff to timely move 
to substitute the personal representative of the Defendant (whether known 
or unknown) with a notice of hearing within ninety (90) days of the notice of 
suggestion of death was correct. 
Finally, the District Court, within its permitted range of discretion, 
dismissed the Plaintiff's action with prejudice because he failed to comply 
with the requirements of URCP Rule 25. 
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ARGUMENT 
I . THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHIN ITS PERMITTED 
RANGE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT STRUCK THE 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE BECAUSE THE 
MOTION SOUGHT TO SUBSTITUTE THE WRONG 
PARTIES. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it struck the 
Plaintiff's motion to substitute for failing to name the proper party. URCP Rule 
25 states: w[u]nless the motion for substitution is made not later than ninety 
days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of 
the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the motion, the 
action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party." URCP Rule 25. Once 
Defendant's death was suggested on the record, the Plaintiff was required to 
move to substitute the Defendant's personal representative even if he did not 
know who that individual would be. See Stoddard v. Smith. 2001 UT 47, H19, 
27 P.3d 546. See also Utah Code Ann. §78-ll-12(l)(a) ("The injured person . 
. . ha[s] a cause of action against the . . . personal representative of the 
wrongdoer for special and general damages . . .")(emphasis added). 
Defendant's counsel even informed the Plaintiff's counsel eleven (11) days 
after filing the "Notice of Suggestion of Death" there was no personal 
representative of the Defendant, at that time. See December 18, 2001 letter 
(R. at 113). Accordingly, all the Plaintiff had to do was file a motion to 
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substitute John/Jane Doe, Personal Representative of the Defendant's Estate, 
as the Defendant. See Stoddard v. Smith. 2001 UT 47,1119, 27 P.3d 546. 
However, the Plaintiff refused to do so. Instead, the Plaintiff attempted to 
substitute the Decedent's surviving siblings as the defendants in this action. 
See Motion to Substitute Proper Party and Memorandum (R. at 65-71). The 
Affidavit of Thomas N. Thompson filed in support of the motion to substitute 
states, "It is necessary to substitute the names of the decedent's heirs for 
the decedent in this case." See Affidavit of Thomas N. Thompson at 115, (R. 
at 74). Such a motion and request is clearly improper. There is no provision 
in the Utah Code that allows a Plaintiff to assert a cause of action against a 
decedent's heirs for the decedent's alleged negligence. See Utah Code Ann. 
§78-11-12. The Plaintiff's cause of action lies against the estate of the 
decedent through the personal representative. Id. Yet, the Plaintiff insisted 
on naming the Decedent's heirs as defendants and refused to substitute the 
personal representative of the estate as the proper party even though he had 
knowledge of this deficiency prior to the expiration of the ninety (90) days. 
Moreover, the Plaintiff only sought to name four of the five surviving 
siblings as defendants in this action. While each sibling qualified potentially as 
the personal representative of the estate, none of the siblings where actually 
appointed as the personal representative of the estate. In addition, if the 
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Court has failed to strike the Plaintiff's motion to substitute, this case would 
have continued against individuals who have no authority or responsibility for 
the Defendant's estate. If the Plaintiff obtained a judgment under that 
scenario, the judgment would attach to the Defendant's siblings' assets, as 
individuals, and not the estate of the Defendant. 
Furthermore, another individual, such as the Defendant's un-served 
sister, Rula Flink, could have been appointed the Defendant's personal 
representative and she would not even be a party to this action. The Plaintiff 
argued that the District Court should alter his motion to substitute the 
descendant's heirs as a party and make it a motion that appoints the heirs as 
the personal representatives of the estate to comply with URCP Rule 25. 
"Once all of the heirs are served, the Plaintiff will move to appoint all of those 
heirs as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Dale H. Curtis, deceased." 
See Opposition to Defendant Motion to Strike Plaintiff's motion to substitute 
Parties at page 3, (R. at 102). However, the District Court did not have the 
authority to appoint personal representatives of the estate. A proceeding to 
appoint a personal representative is independent of the personal injury action. 
See Utah Code Ann. §75-3-106 (1975). Therefore, the Court did not exceed 
its permitted range of discretion by striking the Plaintiff's motion to substitute 
the Defendant's surviving siblings as parties to the action. 
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I I . THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHIN ITS PERMITTED 
DISCRETION WHEN IT STRUCK THE PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE PROPER PARTIES BECAUSE 
IT FAILED TO PROVIDE THE PROPER NOTICE. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it struck the 
Plaintiff's motion to substitute because it failed to comply with the notice 
requirements of URCP Rule 25. The rule specifically requires that the motion 
to substitute be served "together with the notice of hearing." URCP Rule 
25(a)(1). Even assuming arguendo that the Decedent's heirs are proper 
parties, the Plaintiff's failure to serve upon them a "notice of hearing" in the 
manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons is fatal to the motion. 
As the Utah Supreme Court states: "the rule requires that the motion, 
"together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as 
provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided by 
Rule 4 for the service of summons.'" Stoddard v. Smith. 2001 UT 47, H13, 27 
P.3d 546 (emphasis added). The Plaintiff simply failed to meet this 
requirement and the District Court was within its permitted range of discretion 
by striking the motion to substitute for this failure. 
In addition, rather than provide the Defendant's surviving siblings with 
a notice of a hearing set on the motion so that they could appear and 
defend, each notice contained the statement "Should you have any objection 
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to this motion, you should file the same with the Clerk, Third Judicial District 
Court, . . . at any time within fourteen days after service of the attached 
documents upon you. In the absence of a timely objection, the Court may 
grant the Plaintiff's motion without further notice." (As to Sara Flink, R. at 
76; As to N. De Von Curtis, R. at 79; As to Barbara Inkley, R. at 86; As to J. 
Kent Curtis, R. at 119). The Plaintiff attempted to circumvent the required 
hearing by stating that an objection needed to be filed in fourteen days or 
the Court would grant the motion without further notice. However, under 
URCP Rule 25, a party who is being sought to be substituted as a defendant 
is entitled to a hearing. In addition to seeking to substitute the wrong 
parties, the Plaintiff's motion denied those parties the right to a hearing. 
Accordingly, the District Court was within its permitted range of discretion 
when it struck the Plaintiff's motion to substitute Proper Parties because it 
failed to provide the substituted parties with a hearing on the motion. 
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I I I . I N THE ALTERNATIVE, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS 
CORRECT WHEN IT STRUCK THE PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE BECAUSE THE MOTION 
SOUGHT TO SUBSTITUTE THE WRONG PARTIES AND 
FAILED TO CONTAIN THE REQUIRED NOTICE OF 
HEARING. 
In the alternative, if the standard of review of this issue is correctness, 
the District Court was correct when it struck the Plaintiff's motion to substitute 
the decedent's brothers and sisters as the proper parties in this action and 
failed to contain the required notice of hearing. Based upon the foregoing 
argument, the District Court was correct when it struck the Plaintiff's motion to 
substitute because it failed to bring the required parties before the Court. In 
addition, the motion to substitute failed to provide the noticed parties with 
their due process right to appear and defend. Accordingly, the District Court 
was correct by striking the Plaintiff's motion that failed to substitute the proper 
party and failed to include a required notice of hearing. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE BECAUSE UNDER 
URCP RULE 41(B) A DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
WAS PRESUMED. 
The District Court did not exceed its permitted range of discretion when 
it dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice because a dismissal 
18 
pursuant to URCP Rule 25 is an adjudication on the merits and a dismissal with 
prejudice is presumed. In the case of Donahue v. Smith. 2001 UT 46, 27 P.3d 
552, the Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to URCP 
Rule 25 because the Plaintiff failed to file a motion for substitution within 
ninety days after the suggestion of death was filed. The Plaintiff appealed the 
District Court's decision and stated that the District Court erred in dismissing 
the complaint with prejudice. The Utah Supreme Court reviewed URCP Rule 
41 and upheld the District Court's decision to dismiss the action with prejudice. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
[b]ecause the language in rule 41(b) refers only to a dismissal 
under rule 19(b), and because the district court granted the 
motion to dismiss based on plaintiff's failure to comply with rule 
25, the district court properly determined that the dismissal was 
for a failure to 'to comply with these rules.' Therefore, under 
rule 41(b), a dismissal with prejudice was presumed, and 
the district court was not in error to so rule. 
Donahue v. Smith. 2001 UT 46, H8, 27 P.3d 552 (emphasis added). One of 
the reasons for this presumption is that the Decedent's estate needs to be 
closed in a timely manner. A dismissal without prejudice exposes the estate 
and the distributees to additional liabilities for an additional year after the 
dismissal. The ninety day requirement of URCP Rule 25 ensures that cases 
against the estate of a deceased individual will be brought quickly or not at all. 
Accordingly, a dismissal for the Plaintiff's failure to comply with URCP Rule 25 
19 
is presumed to be with prejudice. Therefore, the District Court's action of 
dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice did not exceed the permitted 
range of discretion and such a dismissal was presumed. 
Moreover, the Plaintiff's reliance on the case of Hartford Leasing 
Corporation v. State of Utah, 888 P.2d 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) is 
misplaced. The Plaintiff argues that the District Court should have applied 
the "totality of the circumstances" criteria set forth in Hartford to determine 
whether to dismiss the complaint with or without prejudice. However, the 
Hartford case dealt with a dismissal for lack of prosecution and not a 
dismissal for the failure to timely substitute the proper party. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that a dismissal with prejudice is presumed when 
a party failed to timely substitute a proper party and did not apply the 
"totality of the circumstance" criteria. See Donahue v. Smith, 2001 UT 46, 
118, 27 P.3d 552. Accordingly, the District Court acted as it was presumed to 
do and did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint with 
prejudice. 
Finally, the Plaintiff alleges that the Court should not have dismissed the 
complaint with prejudice because he "did everything possible to bring the 
proper parties before the Court" and "[t]he Defendant. . . made no effort to 
advise the plaintiff of who should properly be appointed as personal 
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representative . . ." See Appellant's Brief at page 17. However, these 
allegations are without merit. The Defendant's counsel informed the Plaintiff 
eleven (11) days after filing the "Notice of Suggestion of Death" there was no 
personal representative of the Defendant. Upon receiving this information, all 
the Plaintiff had to do was file a motion to substitute John/Jane Doe, Personal 
Representative of the Defendant's Estate. The Plaintiff even could have, at 
any time after the notice of suggestion of death, petitioned the Court in a 
separate action to appoint himself or another individual as personal 
representative of the Defendant's estate and then substitute that person as 
the Defendant in the action. See Utah Code Ann. §75-3-203 (1983). 
However, the Plaintiff refused to do so and insisted on attempting to substitute 
the Decedent's surviving siblings as the defendants in this action. The 
Defendant is not required to move the Plaintiff's case on to judgment. See 
Hartford. 888 P.2d at 698. It was the Plaintiff's obligation to move to 
substitute the proper party and include the required notice of hearing. The 
Plaintiff failed to do so in the time allowed. Therefore, the District Court did 




The District Court did not abuse its discretion or was correct in striking a 
motion to substitute that did not seek to substitute the proper party and failed 
to contain the required notice. In addition, a dismissal under URCP Rule 25 for 
the failure to substitute a proper party is an adjudication on the merits and 
presumed to be dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion by dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. 
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the District Court's Order on Motion to 
Strike Plaintiff's motion to substitute Decedent's Heirs as a Party and the 
Order on URCP Rule 25 Motion Dismiss must be upheld. 
DATED this B # day of January 2003. 
PLANT, WALJ-ACE7aTRISTENSEN & KAN ELL 
M - ^ 
TerYy M. Plant 
Cory D. Memmott 
Attorneys for Defendant Curtis 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^o day of January 2003,1 caused a 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing document, to be hand 
delivered to: 
James C. Haskins 
Thomas N. Thompson 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2827 
23 
